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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE “GLOBALIZATION” OF
THE ARCTIC: ASSESSING THE RIGHTS OF NON-ARCTIC
STATES IN THE HIGH NORTH
ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, accelerating climate change has catalyzed the
globalization of Arctic affairs. As the polar ice sheet thaws to record-low
levels, non-Arctic states are increasingly vying for a say in Arctic governance
and economic development. The Arctic Council’s 2013 decision to admit six
new non-Arctic states as permanent observers served to legitimize the interests
of these distant interests in the region. Still, despite this largely symbolic
gesture, non-Arctic states remain significantly disadvantaged with respect to
pursuing their Arctic interests. Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, most of the Arctic’s resources and both currently-accessible
Arctic sea lanes are exclusively controlled by the littoral Arctic states.
Regional actors also dominate arctic governance, as non-Arctic states are
denied speaking and voting privileges at the Arctic Council. This Comment
argues that these disparities not only harm the interests of non-Arctic states,
but also undermine the effectiveness of the Arctic Council. This Comment
concludes that a more inclusive, international approach to Arctic governance
is imperative to address the challenges of a globalized Arctic.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic region is the last global frontier and a region with
enormous and growing geostrategic, economic, climate,
environment, and national security implications for the United States
and the world.
—U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry1

The Arctic Circle, once a frozen and inaccessible backwater under the
exclusive dominion of the littoral Arctic states, is rapidly becoming globalized.
In May 2013, the Arctic Council—the region’s leading governing body—voted
to grant permanent observer status to six new non-Arctic states.2 With the
exception of Italy, all are Asian countries that stand to benefit from newly
accessible shipping routes and resource deposits in the thawing Arctic: China,
Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore.3 While permanent observers are
granted only limited rights, the Council’s expansion to admit these distant
states signals an important recognition that Arctic affairs are no longer “strictly
regional,” as climate change makes the Arctic’s vast new economic
opportunities accessible to the world.4 As the Danish Foreign Minister stated,
“it reflects the fact that many countries outside the Arctic area also have
legitimate interests in the development of the region.”5
Notwithstanding this recognition, non-Arctic states remain significantly
disadvantaged by the legal regimes and norms administering the Arctic region.
First, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS),6 most of the Arctic’s natural resources are divided among the
sovereign jurisdictions of the five littoral Arctic states—Russia, Canada,
Norway, Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands), and the United States
(U.S.).7 Non-Arctic states are thus severely limited in their ability to exploit
1

Press Release, John Kerry, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary Kerry Announces Department
Will Establish a Special Representative for the Arctic Region (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2014/02/221678.htm [hereinafter Secretary Kerry Announces].
2 Steven Lee Myers, Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2013, at A9.
3 Id.
4 Shiloh Rainwater, Comment, Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and its Implications, 66
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 62, 76 (2013).
5 Chris Irvine, China Granted Permanent Observer Status at Arctic Council, TELEGRAPH (May 15,
2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10060624/China-granted-permanent-observerstatus-at-Arctic-Council.html.
6 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
7 See infra Part II.B.2.
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these resources. Second, both currently-accessible trans-Arctic shipping routes
are claimed by Russia and Canada as “internal waters” under international law,
subject to the sovereign control of Moscow and Ottawa.8 As a result, foreign
commercial vessels may face significant restrictions when navigating the
Arctic, including denial of access to the region. Third, although non-Arctic
observers are granted some influence at the Arctic Council, Arctic governance
remains dominated by the circumpolar states.9 Non-Arctic states are therefore
limited in their ability to participate in designing the rules and norms
regulating Arctic affairs.
These disadvantages raise important questions as to the extent to which
non-Arctic states will—and should—participate in Arctic governance and the
development of newly accessible resource deposits and sea lanes in the Arctic
region. While international law certainly privileges the rights of regional
actors, distant states are entitled to some say in Arctic affairs, although the
exact measure of that entitlement is somewhat unclear due to unresolved
disputes among the Arctic states.10 What is clear, however, is that climate
change has transformed the Arctic from an insular region with limited
geopolitical and geoeconomic relevance into the next great frontier of
opportunity for countries around the world. It is imperative, therefore, that the
Arctic states take steps to accommodate the interests of distant actors when
developing the Arctic region.
This Comment will analyze the legal rights of non-Arctic states in the
Arctic region, and will present recommendations for circumpolar actors to
respond to the interests of these states. Part I will explore the environmental
and economic conditions catalyzing the “globalization” of the Arctic, and will
proceed with a case study of China’s embryonic Arctic strategy. Part II will
analyze the two primary legal arrangements governing Arctic affairs—
UNCLOS and the Arctic Council—to determine the extent to which they
restrict and/or expand the rights of non-Arctic states in the Arctic region.
Particular consideration will be given to the practical and symbolic
implications of the Arctic Council’s admission of new observers in 2013.
Finally, Part III will analyze the structural disparities of the current Arctic
regime, and will propose suggestions for Arctic governance reform.
Suggestions will include enhancing the participatory rights of non-Arctic

8
9
10

See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
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observers at the Arctic Council and adopting measures to increase coordination
between regional forums.
I. THE CHANGING ARCTIC: THAW, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE GLOBALIZATION
OF THE HIGH NORTH
A. Climate Change and Economic Potential
The Arctic landscape is transforming at an alarming rate, as regional
temperatures rise twice as fast as the global average.11 Since the 1980s, Arctic
sea-ice coverage has diminished by seventy-five percent,12 reaching record-low
levels in 2007 and 2012.13 September 2014 marked the sixth-lowest level,14
capping off ten consecutive years of the ten-lowest recorded ice extents.15
Given this trend, the Arctic Ocean could experience ice-free summers by
2040,16 though some climate models predict such conditions as early as 2016.17
Indeed, certain areas of the Arctic Ocean and its peripheral seas are already
ice-free during the summer months,18 leading to unprecedented levels of
economic activity in the region.
Of the various natural resources made accessible by the melting of the polar
ice sheet, hydrocarbons are the primary commercial target.19 According to the
11 Christopher Joyce, Arctic is Warming Twice as Fast as World Average, NPR (Dec. 18, 2014, 3:36
AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/18/371438087/arctic-is-warming-twice-as-fast-as-world-average.
12 KATHRYN D. SULLIVAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NOAA’S ARCTIC ACTION PLAN 2 (2014).
13 Maria-José Viñas, Arctic Sea Ice Hits Smallest Extent in Satellite Era, NASA (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/2012-seaicemin.html. Sea ice levels in 2014 melted to the sixthlowest level on record. Doyle Rice, Arctic Sea Ice Melts to 6th-lowest Level on Record, USA TODAY (Sept.
22, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2014/09/22/arctic-sea-ice-extent-minimum/16064037/.
14 Press Release, NASA, 2014 Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Sixth Lowest on Record (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/september/2014-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-sixth-lowest-on-record/#.VEbXmv
l4rYg.
15 SULLIVAN, supra note 12.
16 Id.
17 Nafeez Ahmed, U.S. Navy Predicts Summer Ice Free Arctic by 2016, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:39
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/dec/09/us-navy-arctic-sea-ice-2016-melt.
Indeed, Arctic warming has generally outpaced climate models. See Beating a Retreat, ECONOMIST (Sept. 24,
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21530079; Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change Poses Growing
Threat of Conflict in the Arctic, Report Finds, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2014, 12:54 AM), http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2014/may/14/climate-change-arctic-security-threat-report (“Things are accelerating in the
Arctic faster than we had looked at . . . changes there appear to be much more radical than we envisaged.”).
18 SULLIVAN, supra note 12.
19 See Terry Macalister, Exhausted Global Oil Supplies Make Arctic the New Hydrocarbon Frontier,
GUARDIAN (July 5, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jul/05/oil-suppliesarctic.
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U.S. Geological Survey, roughly twenty-two percent of the world’s
“undiscovered, technically recoverable” petroleum is located in the Arctic
region, including thirteen percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and thirty
percent of its undiscovered natural gas.20 “About eighty-four percent of the
estimated resources are expected to occur [in] offshore [areas].”21 In addition,
240 billion barrels of already-proven oil and natural gas reserves—about ten
percent of the world’s known petroleum—are located in onshore fields north of
the Arctic Circle.22 As global reserves dwindle (leading to ongoing predictions
of impending “peak oil”23—the point at which oil demand eclipses global
supplies), a new “Arctic Gold Rush”24 is underway to exploit these oncefrozen resource deposits.25
Arctic warming is also leading to increased shipping activity in the region.
Compared with traditional routes navigating the Suez and Panama Canals,
newly accessible trans-Arctic shipping lanes are significantly shorter, offering
reduced transit times and lower fuel costs. For example, the Northern Sea
Route, which runs along Russia’s Arctic coastline, cuts the distance from
China to Northern Europe via the Suez Canal by forty percent.26 Similarly, the
Northwest Passage, made up of seven possible routes weaving through

20 Jessica Robertson & Brenda Pierce, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural
Gas Assessed in the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NEWSROOM (July 23, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.
usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.VCcy-_ldV8E. The presence of these resources in the Arctic has
been generally known for decades, yet “full-scale resource development” has only recently become
“technically and economically feasible” with the melting of the polar ice sheet. See ERNST & YOUNG, ARCTIC
OIL AND GAS 2 (2013). In fact, “[s]ome subarctic fields were discovered [as early as] the 1920s.” Andrew
Bishop et al., Petroleum Potential of the Arctic: Challenges and Solutions, OILFIELD REV., Winter 2010-11, at
38. However, the “discovery of the first true Arctic commercial hydrocarbon field . . . occurred [in 1968].” Id.
at 36.
21 Robertson & Pierce, supra note 20.
22 KENNETH J. BIRD ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCES APPRAISAL:
ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 1 (2008).
23 Roger Parloff, Peter Thiel: Peak Oil Lives!, FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/
2014/10/24/peter-thiel-peak-oil-lives/.
24 See generally ROGER HOWARD, THE ARCTIC GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S
NATURAL RESOURCES (2009).
25 Andrew Critchlow, Arctic Drilling is Inevitable: If We Don’t Find Oil in the Ice, Then Russia Will,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11080635/
Arctic-drilling-is-inevitable-if-we-dont-find-oil-in-the-ice-then-Russia-will.html. See, e.g., Atle Staalesen,
Arctic Petroleum Year 2030, BARENTS OBSERVER (Mar. 8, 2011), http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/
energy/arctic-petroleum-year-2030 (explaining that by 2030 Russian oil company Gazprom “intends to
produce an annual 200 billion cubic meters of gas and 10 million tons of oil” in the Arctic).
26 Desmond Upcraft, Arctic Transit: Northern Sea Route, ROYAL BELGIAN INST. OF MARINE ENG’RS,
http://www.gallois.be/ggmagazine_2013/gg_02_03_2013_90.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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Canada’s high Arctic Archipelago,27 provides a forty percent shortcut between
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans over the Panama Canal route.28 A third
Transpolar Sea Route through the center of the Arctic Ocean could cut an
additional twenty percent off transit time from both of these routes; however,
this route will not be navigable until around 2050 when the sea ice at the North
Pole melts to sufficiently thin levels for “icebreakers to carve a straight path
between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.”29
To be sure, commercial traffic through the Arctic has increased markedly in
recent years as warming makes shipping more technically and economically
viable. Since 2010, the Northern Sea Route has been consistently ice-free
during the late summer months each year, opening for six weeks in 2014.30
Transits have significantly increased over this period: whereas just four
commercial vessels navigated the Northern Sea Route in 2010,31 seventy-one
made the trip in 2013 (a fifty-four percent increase over 2012).32 Total cargo
volume has likewise increased, rising from 1.26 million tons in 2012 to 1.36
million in 2013;33 by 2020, that figure could reach sixty-five million tons and
by 2030 it could rise to 120 million.34 Long-term climate forecasts tend to
support these estimates: by mid-century, “most common open-water ships will
be able, without the help of icebreakers, to cross the Northern Sea Route.”35
With this in mind, Russian officials have argued that the Northern Sea Route
will soon “rival traditional trade lanes in service fees, security and quality.”36

27 Andrea Charron, The Northwest Passage Shipping Channel: Sovereignty First and Foremost and
Sovereignty to the Side, 7 J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 1 (2005).
28 Becky Oskin, Cargo Ship Makes 1st-Ever Solo Trip Through Northwest Passage, LIVE SCI. (Oct. 1,
2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.livescience.com/48105-cargo-ship-solos-northwest-passage.html.
29 Emma Innes, By 2050 the Arctic Ice Sheet Will be so Thin that Ships Could be Sailing Across the
North Pole, Experts Predict, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 4, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/
article-2288031/By-2050-Arctic-ice-sheet-ships-sailing-North-Pole-experts-predict.html.
30 Ice Experts Review Northern Sea Route, MAR. EXEC. (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:35 PM), http://www.
maritime-executive.com/article/Ice-Experts-Review-Northern-Sea-Route-2014-10-28 [hereinafter Ice Experts].
31 Trude Petterson, Slow Start on the Northern Sea Route, BARENTS OBSERVER (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/slow-start-northern-sea-route-27-08.
32 Kathrin Keil, Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013, ARCTIC INST. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://
www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/01/evaluation-of-arctic-shipping-season.html. See also Lucy H. London, LNG
Carrier Lined up for Northern Sea Route Transit, TRADEWINDS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.tradewindsnews.
com/weekly/344070/LNG-carrier-lined-up-for-Northern-Sea-Route-transit (stating that in 2014, Russia
received more than 604 applications to sail the route, approving 568 of those applications).
33 Keil, supra note 32.
34 Id.
35 Innes, supra note 29.
36 Gleb Bryanski, Russia’s Putin Says Arctic Trade Route to Rival Suez, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2011, 4:04
PM), http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE78L5TC20110922.
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Global shipping companies appear to agree somewhat with this assessment. In
2014, Russia received a record 604 applications to sail the route37 (up from 421
in 2013),38 indicating the shipping industry’s increasing “expectations for
higher profit margins” by utilizing the shortcut.39
Across the Arctic Ocean in the Canadian Archipelago, the Northwest
Passage is also experiencing increased traffic, albeit at a more modest rate.
From 1903 to the end of the 2014 shipping season, a total of 220 vessels sailed
the whole length of the passage.40 Nearly half (109) of those voyages occurred
after 200741 when overall Arctic sea ice coverage melted to a record-low
level42 and the passage first opened up to shipping in a “viable way.”43
However, even with less ice clogging the route and overall transits on the rise,
commercial voyages remain relatively infrequent. Since 1903, just four tankers
have made the trip, including one in 2011 and another in 2012.44 Moreover, it
was not until 2013 that a bulk carrier first navigated the passage, even then
requiring an icebreaker escort.45 Various factors explain this limited
commercial traffic: parts of the route are shallow; Canada has not prioritized
infrastructure development in the passage; and ice conditions in the passage
remain unpredictable.46 This latter point is particularly instructive. For
example, 2014 was the first time in five years that the passage did not fully
open47 as parts of the route were blocked by thick, hazardous multi-year ice.48
Interestingly, however, 2014 was also the first time that a cargo ship

37

London, supra note 32.
Bob Weber, More Northwest Passage Travel Planned by Danish Shipper, CANADIAN PRESS (Jan. 3,
2014, 7:52 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/more-northwest-passage-travel-planned-by-danishshipper-1.2482731.
39 Ice Experts, supra note 30.
40 R. K. HEADLAND, SCOTT POLAR RES. INST., TRANSITS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE TO THE END OF
THE 2014 NAVIGATION SEASON 1 (2014), http://www.americanpolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NWP2014-X-5-layout-for-PDF.pdf. Note that this only accounts for complete transits of the Northwest Passage;
“incomplete transits are too numerous to record.” Id. at 11.
41 Id. at 8.
42 Viñas, supra note 13.
43 Ker Than, Arctic Meltdown Opens Fabled Northwest Passage, LIVE SCI. (Sept. 14, 2007, 10:59 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/1884-arctic-meltdown-opens-fabled-northwest-passage.html.
44 Weber, supra note 38.
45 HEADLAND, supra note 40, at 10.
46 See Paul Waldie, A Reality Check on the Northwest Passage ‘boom’, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/breakthrough/will-cold-dark-northwest-passage-seemore-ships/article16231502/.
47 Ice Experts, supra note 30.
48 See Ollie Williams, Arctic Ambition: The Race to Sail the Northwest Passage Heats Up, CNN (Sept. 8,
2014, 1:03 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/08/sport/arctic-sailing-northwest-passage/.
38
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successfully navigated the entire Northwest Passage without an icebreaker
escort.49 By mid-century, this could be a regular occurrence as the melting ice
yields to navigation by solo ice-strengthened ships and even some ordinary
vessels.50
In sum, climate change has transformed the Arctic from a frozen wasteland
into the “last global frontier”51 of economic opportunity. While newlyunlocked Arctic hydrocarbons will help alleviate global energy needs, transArctic sea lanes will impact global trade patterns as shipping through the
region becomes more cost-effective. Still, overall economic activity in the
Arctic is fairly limited at this point,52 and will remain that way for some time
due to residual challenges associated with operating in the region.53 The
benefits of Arctic shipping, for example, are offset by the need for icehardened vessels and icebreaker escorts, the “unpredictability of the ice,” and
the “shortness of the shipping season.”54 To ensure that shipping through the
Arctic is safe and economically viable, the Arctic states must develop
“adequate infrastructure, such as icebreakers, ice-class vessels, technical
services, emergency response mechanisms and search and rescue facilities.”55
Only then will the Arctic become a key locus of global economic activity.
49 Jeremy Plester, Events That Mark Arctic Warming, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.
theguardian.com/news/2014/oct/26/weatherwatch-arctic-warming-northwest-passage-siberia.
50 Innes, supra note 29.
51 Secretary Kerry Announces, supra note 1.
52 See Keil, supra note 32 (showing that while shipping through the Northern Sea Route is on an upward
trend, it accounts for a very small percentage of global trade and compares the seventy-one transits in 2013
with roughly 18,000 annual transits through the Suez Canal).
53 See Alister Doyle, High Arctic Costs Deter Business Despite Thaw, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2014, 9:03
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/27/business-arctic-idUSL6N0SJ3YW20141027 (stating that
other factors such as falling global oil prices are also leading businesses to look elsewhere for cheaper drilling
opportunities). See also Steve Banker, Logistics Impacts From Widening the Panama Canal, FORBES (Sept. 6,
2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2013/09/06/logistics-impacts-from-widening-thepanama-canal/ (stating that the current Panama Canal widening project will help accommodate more traffic
through the route, particularly a “new class of supersized cargo ships . . . that are more than twice as big as the
historical cargo shipping fleet.”).
54 Short and Sharp, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21556803.
55 Vijay Sakhuja, Russia Commits to Building Northern Sea Route Infrastructure, VALDAI CLUB (Aug. 8,
2014, 4:05 PM), http://valdaiclub.com/economy/71280.html. Russia has taken the lead in this regard, building
several new icebreakers. See New Russian Nuclear-Powered Icebreakers Named ‘Arctic,’ ‘Siberia’ and ‘Ural’,
SPUTNIK NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140807/191814028/New-Russian-NuclearPowered-Icebreakers-Named-Arctic-Siberia-and.html. Russia has also started building military bases in its
Arctic territory. Alexey Eremenko, Russia Starts Building Military Bases in the Arctic, MOSCOW TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-starts-building-military-bases-in-thearctic/506650.html. At the same time, Russia’s overall Arctic strategy generally emphasizes the need for
additional infrastructure investments. See Sakhuja, supra note 55.
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B. Geopolitics and Distant Interests in the High North
The Arctic Circle accounts for just six percent of the world’s surface area,56
yet it is rapidly becoming “one of the most hotly contested territories on
Earth.”57 Unlike the Antarctic where territorial claims are effectively barred by
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,58 the Arctic region is “up for grabs” under
international law;59 as the Arctic thaws, circumpolar actors are therefore
“racing to carve up the region” and claim its untapped riches.60 Until recently,
this “scramble for the Arctic”61 posed only limited challenges for regional
governance. Territorial disputes arising over the last few decades, for example,
were resolved via bilateral cooperation, not conflict.62 More recently, however,
the littoral Arctic states have begun staking overlapping claims to the center of
the Arctic Ocean63 and have grown increasingly assertive with respect to their
sovereignty in the region.64 As a result, geopolitical tensions among the Arctic
56 PHILIP BUDZIK, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ARCTIC OIL AND NATURAL GAS POTENTIAL 1 (2009),
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf.
57 Ty McCormick, Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 7, 2014), http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/07/anthropology_of_an_idea_arctic_sovereignty_oil.
58 See Antarctic Treaty art. 4, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
59 McCormick, supra note 57.
60 Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 64. See generally MICHAEL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC?
UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES IN THE NORTH (2010) [hereinafter BYERS, WHO OWNS THE
ARCTIC?].
61 See Jayaseelan Naidoo, The Scramble for the Arctic and the Dangers of Russia’s Race for Oil,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayaseelan-naidoo/the-scramblefor-the-arctic_b_4223661.html.
62 MICHAEL BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 6 (2013) [hereinafter BYERS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC].
63 Denmark Challenges Russia and Canada Over North Pole, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309.
64 See Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic. In 2007, Russia planted a flag at the North Pole, id., and
resumed Cold War-era strategic bomber flights in the Arctic, see Russia Restarts Cold War Patrols, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6950986.stm. Russia has reopened Arctic military
bases, see Karl Ritter, Cold War-Style Spy Games Return to Melting Arctic, ASSOC. PRESS (June 11, 2014),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cold-war-style-spy-games-return-melting-arctic; is adding new nuclear attack
submarines to its Northern Fleet, see Matthew Bodner, Russia's Northern Fleet Gets New Nuclear Attack
Submarine, MOSCOW TIMES (June 17, 2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-snorthern-fleet-gets-new-nuclear-attack-submarine/502078.html; and plans to “deploy troops along the entire
length of the Arctic,” see Thomas Nilsen, Russia Says No Need for NATO in Arctic, Expands Own Military
Presence, BARENTS OBSERVER (Oct. 22, 2014), http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/10/russia-saysno-need-nato-arctic-expands-own-military-presence-22-10. For its part, Canada has bolstered its Arctic
military forces, see Allan Woods, Canada Looking at Building Military Bases in Arctic, STAR (July 14, 2011),
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/07/14/star_exclusive_canada_looking_at_building_military_bases_
in_arctic.html, and staked its own claim to the North Pole, see Jenny Johnson, Who Owns the North Pole?
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states have escalated, fueling speculation of impending conflict in the High
North.65
Regional stakeholders are not, however, the only players in the emerging
Arctic “Great Game.”66 Over the last decade, accelerating climate change has
catalyzed the “globalization” of the Arctic as an “issue area;”67 as the Arctic
melts, non-Arctic states with economic interests in the region are also
competing for a say in the development of the Arctic. In short, the Arctic “is
evolving from a regional frozen backwater into a global hot issue.”68
Although numerous non-Arctic states have expressed their intent to
participate in Arctic affairs, all are motivated by similar interests in the
warming Arctic; namely, emergent resource exploitation and trans-Arctic
shipping opportunities. Detailed analyses of each individual Arctic program
are therefore unnecessary. Rather, this section will proceed with a case study
of China’s extensive Arctic policies, which are emblematic of its non-Arctic
peers’ aspirations and strategic goals in the Arctic region.
1. The People’s Republic of China: The Dragon Heads North
a. China’s Arctic Interests
By virtually every measure,69 China’s meteoric ascendance to economic
dominance over the last few decades has been the defining narrative of

Debate Heats Up as Climate Change Transforms Arctic, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2014, 11:08 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/who-owns-the-north-pole-debate-heats-up-as-climate-changetransforms-arctic.html (arguing that the area “is central to defending [its] Arctic sovereignty”). But see
Michael Byers, The North Pole is a Distraction, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 20, 2014, 3:00 AM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-north-pole-is-a-distraction/article20126915/
[hereinafter
Byers, The North Pole is a Distraction].
65 See, e.g., Ben Makuch, Cold War Games: Russia’s Ramping Up Its Military Presence in the Arctic,
VICE MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/cold-war-games-russiasramping-up-its-military-presence-in-the-arctic.
66 McCormick, supra note 57.
67 See Donald R. Rothwell, The Law of the Sea and Arctic Governance, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
271, 273 (2013).
68 Alexander Stubb, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Fin., A New Era and Finland’s Arctic Policy,
Keynote Speech at the 20th Anniversary Seminar of the Arctic Center (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.formin.fi/
public/default.aspx?contentid=171839.
69 Paul C. Avey et al., The Ivory Tower Survey: How IR Scholars See the World, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 3,
2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/03/the-ivory-tower-survey/. Academics and policymakers alike
continue to view the rising power of China as the biggest foreign policy issue facing the U.S. Id.
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international relations.70 Since instituting market reforms in 1978, China’s
economic growth has generally outpaced the rest of the world,71 with annual
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates averaging ten percent.72 Although
this rate has slowed somewhat in recent years,73 China’s economy remains
strong74 and is on course to sustaining eight percent GDP growth rates for
another ten to fifteen years or longer.75 Indeed, in terms of purchasing power
parity, China is now the world’s largest economy, with an estimated GDP of
$17.6 trillion (compared with $17.4 trillion for the U.S.).76
Maintaining this economic momentum, however, “poses a considerable
strategic problem for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”77 Namely, over
the last two decades, China’s robust economic performance has resulted in
massive dependence on foreign resource inputs.78 Up until the early 1990s,
China was a net oil exporter;79 today, however, China is the world’s largest net
70 See, e.g., Charles Glaser, Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 80 (noting that the “rise of China will likely be the most important
international relations story of the twenty-first century”). China’s economic development has sparked endless
debate as to whether China can rise peacefully to great power status. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The
Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 381, 381 (2010).
Mearsheimer, the architect of the “offensive realism” school of thought in international relations, is one of the
most vocal scholars predicting that “China cannot rise peacefully.” Id. at 382. In any event, many scholars
view China’s rise to superpower status as an inevitability. See, e.g., Arvind Subramanian, The Inevitable
Superpower: Why China’s Dominance is a Sure Thing, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 67.
71 China Country Profile—Overview, BBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiapacific-13017877.
72 China Overview, WORLD BANK (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/
overview.
73 Mark Magnier, Lingling Wei & Ian Talley, China Economic Growth is Slowest in Decades, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-gdp-growth-is-slowest-in-24-years-1421719453
(stating that in 2013, China’s economy grew at a rate of 7.7%, while in 2014 the economy slowed to 7.4%).
Some analysts argue that “the underlying causes for this slowdown are global, not China specific.” Lin Yifu,
Western Analysts Are Wrong: China’s Economy is Going Strong, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/lin-yifu/western-analysts-china-economy_b_4762222.html. In any event, China is
now the world’s second-fastest growing economy, lagging only behind India. Eric Bellman, India Passes
China to Become Fastest-Growing Economy, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/
indiarealtime/2015/02/11/its-official-india-has-passed-china-to-become-the-worlds-fastest-growing-economy/.
74 Michael Schuman, China’s Economy Continues to Defy Gravity. That May Not Be a Good Thing,
TIME (June 16, 2014), http://time.com/2990640/chinas-economy-continues-to-defy-gravity-that-may-not-be-agood-thing/.
75 Yifu, supra note 73.
76 Brett Arends, It’s Official: America is Now No. 2, MKT. WATCH (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:18 AM), http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/its-official-america-is-now-no-2-2014-12-04.
77 Rainwater, supra note 4, at 64.
78 China Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH (last
updated Feb. 4, 2014).
79 Id.
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importer of crude oil and other liquids.80 In terms of demand, China is now the
second-largest oil consumer and the largest overall energy consumer in the
world.81 To be sure, China has taken steps to control the rapid growth of its
foreign oil dependence. For example, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan includes a
measure to “cap oil imports at 61 percent by the end of 2015,” which in 2012
amounted to fifty-seven percent of its needs.82 Yet China’s breakneck
economic growth requires exponential amounts of energy, and attempts to cap
total imports are unlikely to be successful in the immediate term. By 2020, the
U.S. Energy Information Institute projects that China will import more than
sixty-six percent of its total oil; seventy-two percent will be imported by 2040,
as demand is expected to outpace domestic crude supply.83
Given this rising foreign energy dependence, the prospect of vast
hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic is a natural draw for the CCP.84 Indeed,
China is already strengthening trade relations with the Arctic states in order to
secure long-term access to Arctic resources.85 In April 2013, for example,
China signed a free trade deal with Iceland, the “first of its kind between China
and a European country.”86 China is also investing in infrastructure and
offshore energy projects in the Arctic. In 2013, China paid Rosneft—Russia’s
state-owned oil company—$60 billion to develop oil fields in the Arctic
Ocean.87 Since resource extraction in the Arctic is expensive and difficult, such
investments can help position China as the “biggest player in [the]Arctic.”88

80 Candace Dunn, China is Now the World’s Largest Net Importer of Petroleum and Other Liquid Fuels,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531#.
China’s rising oil consumption alone “accounted for one-third of the world's oil consumption growth in 2013.”
China Overview, supra note 78.
81 China Overview, supra note 78.
82 Michael Barris, China’s Oil Demand is Growing, US Agency Says, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:52
PM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-02/06/content_17269251.htm.
83 China Overview, supra note 78.
84 See discussion supra Part I.A.
85 See Rainwater, supra note 4, at 72–73.
86 Chen Zhi, Xinhua Insight: Arctic Council Observer Status Guarantees China’s Legitimate Rights,
XINHUANET (May 16, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-05/16/c_132387742.
htm.
87 Michael Byers, China Could be the Future of Arctic Oil, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 22, 2013, 2:09 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013821135829162420.html [hereinafter Byers, China
Could be the Future of Arctic Oil].
88 Id.
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Aside from access to new resource deposits, “the Arctic offers China
diversity, security and savings.”89 China currently imports most of its energy
from the Middle East, with nineteen percent of its crude oil supplied by Saudi
Arabia in 2013.90 Angola is the second-largest source, together with Saudi
Arabia providing thirty-three percent of China’s total crude oil imports.91 After
that, key suppliers include Russia, Oman, Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela.92
Although diversified, these sources constitute a perennial strategic problem for
the CCP: as a symptom of its foreign energy reliance, China is now dependent
on exporting nations located in politically volatile regions; as a result, China’s
energy security is constantly at risk.93 For example, although Sudan and South
Sudan were once major suppliers, political conflicts between the two nations
over oil resources caused production to shut down in 2012.94 The Arctic, by
contrast, is politically stable; China is thus looking north to further diversify its
suppliers and ensure the security of its energy lifeline.
In addition to volatility at the source, China worries about the vulnerability
of its supplies during transit. Two critical maritime “choke points” are of vital
concern: the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of
Malacca, linking the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.95 Around fifty percent
of China’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz,96 which Iran has
occasionally threatened to close to “deny Persian Gulf oil to the global
market.”97 The Strait of Malacca, however, is even more troubling. Fully
eighty percent of China’s oil transits this waterway, which is just two miles
wide at its narrowest opening (compared with twenty miles in the Strait of
Hormuz).98 China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma” is that, with limited powerprojection capabilities, its energy supply-line is vulnerable to a hostile

89 Andreas Kuersten, Russian Sanctions, China and the Arctic, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 3, 2015), http://
thediplomat.com/2015/01/russian-sanctions-china-and-the-arctic/.
90 Dunn, supra note 80.
91 China Overview, supra note 78.
92 Id.
93 See Rainwater, supra note 4, at 65.
94 Tore Knos & Michele Zebich-Knos, South Sudan: Oil, the Environment and Border Conflicts, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 22, 2013), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2013/02/22/86550/.
95 World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/
regions-tpics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC/ (last updated Nov. 10, 2014).
96 Annika Folkeson, Part 1: Key Facts on Strait of Hormuz, IRAN PRIMER (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:20 AM),
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/jan/11/part-1-key-facts-strait-hormuz.
97 Rosemary A. Kelanic, China’s Changing Oil Calculus, NAT’L INT. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-changing-oil-calculus-9385.
98 Id.
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shutdown in the Strait, particularly by the Indian Navy.99 This fear is
compounded by growing threats of piracy in the Strait—from 2009 to 2013,
incidents increased by 200% (from 42 to 125),100 making the Strait of Malacca
the world’s “piracy hotspot.”101 In light of these vulnerabilities, trans-Arctic
shipping routes provide an attractive, secure alternative for China’s maritime
trade.102
Economic factors provide additional incentives for trade diversion through
the Arctic. As discussed above, Arctic straits are significantly shorter than
traditional routes.103 For example, the distance from Shanghai to Hamburg
navigating the Northern Sea Route is roughly thirty percent shorter than the
route via the Suez Canal.104 Such a reduction in transit times and distance
could result in substantial fuel savings and “increase China’s export potential
to Europe.”105 To realize these benefits, China is already investing more
heavily in Arctic shipping research than even the U.S.106 Chinese analysts
predict that, by 2020, five to fifteen percent of China’s global trade, primarily
container traffic, could use the Northern Sea Route.107 And by 2030, up to half
of the containers shipped between East Asia and Northern Europe could be
diverted north through the Arctic.108 Whatever the accuracy of these
predictions, China certainly anticipates realizing some economic benefit from
Arctic shipping.

99 Shashank Joshi, Can India Blockade China, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 12, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/
08/can-india-blockade-china/.
100 Ted Kemp, Crime on the High Seas: The World’s Most Pirated Waters, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2015), http://
www.cnbc.com/id/101969104.
101 Patrick Winn, The World Has a New Piracy Hotspot, GLOBAL POST (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/indonesia/140326/malacca-strait-piracy-hotspot.
102 But see BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 261. Byers notes that nonstate actors such as illegal immigrants and terrorists pose the greatest security threat in the Arctic, as they
might “take advantage of ice-free waters to move contraband, people, or WMDs into North America or
Europe, or between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.” Id. However, these are not significant threats at the
present. See id.
103 See discussion supra Part I.A.
104 Jonathan Masters, The Thawing Arctic: Risks and Opportunities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 16,
2013), http://www.cfr.org/arctic/thawing-arctic-risks-opportunities/p32082.
105 Kuersten, supra note 89.
106 Darryl D’monte, China Spending More on Arctic Sea Route Research Than US, BUS. STANDARD
(Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/china-spending-more-on-arcticsea-route-research-than-us-113031400028_1.html.
107 Trude Pettersen, China Starts Commercial Use of Northern Sea Route, BARENTS OBSERVER (Mar. 14,
2013), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/03/china-starts-commercial-use-northern-sea-route-14-03.
108 D’monte, supra note 106.

RAINWATER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

11/9/2015 2:45 PM

GLOBALIZATION OF THE ARCTIC

129

b. China’s Arctic Strategy
Notwithstanding its status as a non-Arctic state, China has pursued a robust
foreign policy line towards the Arctic region since the 1990s.109 Thus far,
China’s Arctic strategy has primarily emphasized scientific research and
diplomacy.110 China currently spends around $60 million annually on polar
research, including $15 million on yearly expeditions to the Antarctic and
Arctic.111 Notably, China operates the “world’s largest non-nuclear
icebreaker,”112 and has conducted six Arctic research expeditions113 aboard the
vessel since purchasing it from Ukraine in 1993.114 By 2016, China plans to
build a second, more advanced icebreaker worth $613 million to further
enhance its “polar research capability.”115 In addition to these “mobile research
station[s],”116 China also maintains a research base in Norway’s Svalbard
Archipelago117 (north of the Arctic Circle) as well as a “China-Nordic Arctic
Research Center” in Shanghai.118 With these extensive research capabilities,
China intends to assist not only in its own “economic and social development,
but also [to] help[] deepen humanity’s knowledge of climate change.”119
While China’s polar research interests are no doubt genuine,120 these
initiatives suggest that “Beijing is eager to camouflage its true interests in the

109 Hugh Stephens, Breaking the Ice: China’s Emerging Arctic Strategy, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/breaking-the-ice-chinas-emerging-arctic-strategy/. For a lengthier treatment of
China’s Arctic strategy, see generally Rainwater, supra note 4.
110 Rainwater, supra note 4, at 71.
111 Anne-Marie Brady, Polar Stakes: China’s Polar Activities as a Benchmark for Intentions, JAMESTOWN
(July 19, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39647
&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=99f7e4c63e504c25e7be08acfda148db#.VFhxa_nF98F.
112 Paul McLeary, The Arctic: China Opens a New Strategic Front, WORLD POL. REV. (May 19, 2010),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5558/the-arctic-china-opens-a-new-strategic-front.
113 Aboard Xuelong, Arctic Ice Shrinkage Alarms Returning Chinese Expedition, XINHUANET (Sept. 22,
2014, 4:36 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/22/c_133662994.htm.
114 McLeary, supra note 112.
115 Wang Qian, New Icebreaker Planned by 2016: Officials, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/06/content_17216579.htm.
116 Id.
117 China Launches Arctic Station, XINHUANET (July 28, 2004, 7:49 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2004-07/28/content_1666797.htm.
118 Thomas Nilsen, China–Nordic Arctic Research Center Opens in Shanghai, BARENTS OBSERVER (Dec.
12, 2013), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/12/china-nordic-arctic-research-center-opens-shanghai12-12.
119 Zhang Yunlong & Ren Qinqin, China Defends Arctic Research, XINHUANET (Jan. 31, 2012, 10:58
PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/31/c_122637030.htm.
120 For example, China fears that Arctic warming will “turn the Arctic ecosystem upside down, affecting
many animals that are adapted to a life with sea ice.” Stefan Rahmstorf, Silent Warning That Must be Heeded,
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region.”121 Publicly, China represents its sense of entitlement to Arctic
opportunities by depicting the Arctic as an “international zone where changes
must make sense for all countries.”122 In 2009, for example, China’s Assistant
Minister of Foreign Affairs cautioned that Arctic countries should “ensure a
balance of coastal countries’ interests and the common interests of the
international community.”123 More recently, Chinese officials have also begun
to refer to China as an “Arctic stakeholder”124 and a “near-Arctic state”125—
remarkable assertions considering that the shortest distance between China’s
northern border and the Arctic Circle is 900 miles.126 Nevertheless, China
contends that its proximity to the Arctic means that it is directly affected by
“natural changes . . . in the Arctic, as reflected in China’s climate, ecological
environment, [and] agricultural production.”127 As such, China believes that it
is entitled to participate in Arctic affairs.
Still, despite this sometimes brazen rhetoric, China’s Arctic strategy
privileges soft power and cooperation over conflict.128 Over the last few years,
China has actively cultivated bilateral relations with the Arctic states in order
to position itself as an “indispensable”129 Arctic player. For example, in the
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, China supplied economic aid to Iceland that
proved critical to its recovery.130 China and Iceland subsequently signed a free
trade deal, the first Sino-European agreement of its kind.131 Meanwhile, China

CHINA DAILY (Oct. 21, 2011, 8:05 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-10/21/content_13945874.
htm. These conditions will in turn “amplify global warming” and cause “sea levels worldwide [to] rise.” Id.
121 Arthur Guschin, Understanding China’s Arctic Policies, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
thediplomat.com/2013/11/understanding-chinas-arctic-policies/.
122 Id.
123 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 125.
124 Kit Dawnay, China’s Ambitions in the Arctic, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 19, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://www.currentintelligence.net/analysis/2013/3/19/chinas-ambitions-in-the-arctic.html.
125 Johan Nylander, China a ‘Near-Arctic State’: Swedish Think Tank, SWEDISH WIRE (May 11, 2012,
4:35 AM), http://www.swedishwire.com/business/13827-china-a-near-arctic-state-swedish-think-tank.
126 Gwynn Guilford, What is China’s Arctic Game Plan?, ATLANTIC (May 16, 2013), http://www.
theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-chinas-arctic-game-plan/275894/.
127 China Seeks Pragmatic Cooperation with Arctic Countries, XINHUANET (Nov. 2, 2014), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/02/c_133759443.htm.
128 See generally Rainwater, supra note 4.
129 Gordon G. Chang, China’s Arctic Play, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 9, 2010), http://thediplomat.com/2010/03/
chinas-arctic-play/. In 2010, Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo famously pronounced that “China must play an
indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.” Id.
130 Andrew Ward, Iceland Secures China Currency Swap Deal, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2010, 10:45 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/81d100de-73fb-11df-87f5-00144feabdc0.html.
131 Zhi, supra note 86.
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has invested substantial capital in Greenlandic resource projects,132 indirectly
“courting Danish leaders.”133 As a result of these measures, Iceland and
Denmark have grown “very supportive of China having a louder voice in
Arctic affairs.”134 Ultimately, this strategy resulted in all eight Arctic states
endorsing China’s application for observer status at the Arctic Council, a
central goal of the CCP.135
In sum, China’s foreign policies towards the Arctic have proven effective
in realizing its economic and strategic goals in the region thus far. As with all
non-Arctic countries, however, China’s Arctic ambitions are limited by the
international legal regimes and norms regulating the Arctic region. The
following Part will analyze those legal arrangements, and Part III will present
recommendations for Arctic governance reform in order to better incorporate
the interests of non-Arctic states in the High North.
II. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: DISTANT PARTICIPANTS IN A REGIONAL REGIME
A. Introduction
No single comprehensive legal regime currently governs the Arctic
region.136 Rather, “the regulatory picture [concerning the Arctic] is a diffuse
one,”137 consisting of a “patchwork of international treaties . . . various
regional and sub-regional agreements, national laws and soft-law
agreements.”138 In this multi-layered framework, domestic legislation plays a
particularly significant role, since much of the region “falls within the scope of
national sovereignty of the Arctic nations.”139 Beyond that, a handful of
governance arrangements predominate in regulating the Arctic region.

132 Martin Breum & Jorgen Chemnitz, No, Greenland Does Not Belong to China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/no-greenland-does-not-belong-to-china.html?_r=0.
133 Kuersten, supra note 89.
134 Id.
135 See discussion infra Part II.C.
136 LILLY WEIDEMANN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT: WITH
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 228 (2014). By contrast, the Antarctic is comprehensively
regulated under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Id.
137 Davor Vidas, The Polar Marine Environment in Regional Cooperation, in PROTECTING THE POLAR
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 102 (Davor Vidas ed., 2000).
138 WEIDEMANN, supra note 136.
139 Id. at 45.
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First, UNCLOS regulates “activities on, over, and beneath the Arctic
[Ocean].”140 As with all the world’s oceans, this treaty establishes navigation
rights through Arctic waterways and sets guidelines for demarcating the
maritime boundaries of the Arctic states. Second, the Arctic Council
constitutes the “principle international forum for regional collaboration.”141
The Council’s work spans a wide range of areas including scientific
assessments, policy statements and recommendations, guidelines, best
practices, and, more recently, binding Arctic instruments.142 The Council is
well-respected, and it is increasingly viewed as the most important political
body in the region.
Given the primacy of these legal arrangements, this Part will analyze the
extent to which they limit and/or expand the rights of non-Arctic states seeking
to participate in Arctic affairs. From the outset, it is important to note that
under the current legal regime, distant states possess very limited rights in the
Arctic relative to regional ones. As the Arctic globalizes, however, this
imbalance raises questions as to whether the current regional model of
governance is “adequate,” or whether a more inclusive, international approach
is now “necessary.”143 As argued below, the regional approach is no longer
sufficient to address changing conditions in the Arctic; the Arctic legal regime
should therefore be reformed to better incorporate the interests of non-Arctic
states in the Arctic region.
B. The Law of the Sea Treaty
1. Solidifying the Hegemony of UNCLOS in the Arctic
Called the “constitution” and “Magna Charta” of the oceans, UNCLOS
provides a “comprehensive framework for oceans governance.”144 Since
opening for signature on December 10, 1982,145 UNCLOS has succeeded in
sustainably balancing the sovereign rights of littoral countries with the
140 The Emerging Arctic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/polarregions/emergingarctic/
p32620#!/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
141 Id.
142 Andrea Charron, Has the Arctic Council Become Too Big?, INT’L REL. & SECURITY NETWORK (Aug.
15, 2014), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=182827.
143 Rothwell, supra note 67, at 273.
144 Robert C. De Tolve, At What Cost? America’s UNCLOS Allergy in the Time of “Lawfare”, 61 NAVAL
L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). UNCLOS codifies “centuries of state practice and opinio juris.” BYERS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 6.
145 UNCLOS, supra note 6.
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“traditional navigational freedoms guaranteed all nations.”146 To date, fully
167 countries have ratified UNCLOS, including seven of the eight circumpolar
states.147 The final circumpolar country—the U.S.—“accepts the key
provisions of UNCLOS as customary international law.”148 Interestingly, only
one provision in the entire convention deals specifically with ice-covered
regions. Article 234, or the “Arctic Article,”149 permits “regulation for the
prevention of pollution and safety of navigation in ice-covered areas;”150 it
does not, however, function to “clarify the status of ice.”151 Still, the treaty’s
various provisions apply normally in the Arctic Ocean as they do elsewhere,
creating an expansive regulatory regime.152
In May 2008, the five littoral Arctic states (the “Arctic Five”)—Russia,
Canada, Norway, Denmark and the U.S.—signed the “Ilulissat Declaration,”
thereby reaffirming the primacy of UNCLOS as regulator of the Arctic
Ocean.153 While no explicit reference is made to UNCLOS, the Declaration is
“very precise” in referring to the law of the sea,154 noting that:
[A]n extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic
Ocean . . . [T]he law of the sea provides for important rights and
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including
ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research,
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal
framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping
claims.155

The Declaration concludes by observing that there is “no need to develop a
new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”156 Thus, despite
146

De Tolve, supra note 144.
Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related
Agreements as at 3 October 2014, U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/
reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm# (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
148 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 28.
149 Stuart B. Kaye, Territorial Sea Baselines Along Ice Covered Coasts: International Practice and Limits
of the Law of the Sea, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 75, 95 n.7 (2004).
150 Id. at 77.
151 Id. at 95 n.7.
152 See BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 6.
153 Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration, 1–2 (May 28, 2008), http://www.oceanlaw.org/
downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.
154 Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and Arctic Shipping, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 67, 72
(2013).
155 Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 153.
156 Id.
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calls over the years for the creation of a new “Arctic treaty” similar to the
Antarctic model,157 the Declaration entrenches the authority of UNCLOS in the
Arctic, while more generally affirming the Arctic Five’s commitment to the
current multi-layered Arctic framework.158
2. Territorial Provisions
For decades, UNCLOS has “played a central role in determining the
boundaries between the maritime zones of adjacent coastal states”; the Arctic
is no exception, with the same rules applying in the region as elsewhere in the
world.159 Under UNCLOS, coastal Arctic states may claim sovereignty over
territorial seas extending twelve nautical miles from shore.160 Within this band,
coastal states can restrict foreign shipping and have “absolute rights” over
living resources found in the water column (fish) and nonliving seabed
resources (hydrocarbons).161 Further out, coastal states retain absolute rights
over seabed resources and fisheries located within exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) extending 200 nautical miles from shore,162 and seabed rights beyond
200 nautical miles where they can demonstrate that the seabed is a “natural
prolongation of [their] land territory” (i.e., the “extended continental shelf”).163
Only beyond the continental shelf are seabed resources considered the
“common heritage of mankind,” equally open to exploration and exploitation
by non-littoral and coastal nations alike.164
Until recently, a small unclaimed “doughnut hole” at the center of the
Arctic Ocean was thought to constitute this area beyond the sovereign
jurisdictions of the Arctic countries.165 One analyst even went so far as to
argue that “[n]o country will ever ‘own’ the North Pole, which is located 400

157 John B. Bellinger, Treaty on Ice, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/
opinion/23bellinger.html?_r=2&.
158 See Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 153.
159 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 6.
160 UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 2.
161 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 6.
162 UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 57.
163 Id. arts. 76–77.
164 UNCLOS, supra note 6, pmbl.
165 One analyst estimated that roughly eighty-eight percent of the Arctic seabed would likely be claimed
by the circumpolar states. See Joseph Spears, The Snow Dragon Moves into the Arctic Ocean Basin, 11 CHINA
BRIEF 1, 12–13 (2011).
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miles to the north of any land.”166 As such, the central Arctic Ocean would
“belong[] to humanity,”167 and would be open to development by all states.
Contrary to these assertions, however, the littoral Arctic states have begun
staking overlapping claims to the center of the Arctic. In late 2014, Denmark
submitted an official claim to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) that includes “all of the North Pole and 895,000 sq
km of the Arctic.”168 In preparation for its claim, Denmark “spent $55m and 12
years collecting data.”169 Yet Denmark is not alone in claiming the Pole;
Russia asserted jurisdiction over the area as early as 2001, although its initial
claim was deemed to be “insufficient” by the CLCS.170 Russia has since
conducted extensive research to support an updated claim to the area,171 which
it is expected to submit soon.172 Further complicating affairs, Canada has also
expressed its intention to claim the North Pole,173 arguing that the area “is
central to defending [its] Arctic sovereignty.”174 A fourth claim could
conceivably be staked by the U.S., which has conducted research on the length
of its continental shelf extending from Alaska to the North Pole;175 however,
without ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot submit its evidence to the CLCS.
The final littoral state—Norway—has indicated that it will not assert a claim to
the North Pole under UNCLOS.176
At the center of the dispute is the so-called Lomonosov Ridge, a massive
underwater range splitting the central Arctic Ocean that Denmark, Russia, and
Canada all claim as a “natural prolongation” of their landmass.177 In other
words, each claims the Lomonosov Ridge as part of their extended continental
shelf under UNCLOS Article 76.178 Since coastal states may exercise
sovereignty over resources located in the sedimentary strata of their continental
166 Michael Byers, Rules for the North Pole, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
08/19/opinion/19iht-edbyers19.html [hereinafter Byers, Rules for the North Pole].
167 Id.
168 Richard Milne, Denmark’s Claim to North Pole Fans Geopolitical Rivalry, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014,
6:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49a5a1ca-85e3-11e4-b11b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P3558ktp.
169 Id.
170 Johnson, supra note 64.
171 Id.
172 Milne, supra note 168.
173 Frozen Conflict, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/international/2163
6756-denmark-claims-north-pole-frozen-conflict.
174 Byers, The North Pole is a Distraction, supra note 64.
175 Johnson, supra note 64.
176 Id.
177 Milne, supra note 168.
178 See UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 76.
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shelves,179 these claims have the potential to effectively lockup the entirety of
the Arctic seabed and the energy resources found within (i.e., by effectively
eliminating the previously-imagined “doughnut hole” in the central Arctic
Ocean).180 Non-Arctic states would thus be shut-off entirely from the ability to
independently exploit the Arctic’s hydrocarbon wealth.
It is noteworthy, however, that even absent these claims, the vast majority
of offshore energy resources are already expected to fall within the Arctic
Five’s uncontested jurisdictions closer to shore.181 Moreover, drilling
operations in the central Arctic are extraordinarily difficult and expensive,
given the harsh conditions in the area.182 Consequently, non-Arctic countries
may benefit from simply cooperating with the coastal Arctic states in
developing the energy resources located within their uncontested EEZs. In
either event, distant states will have extremely limited prospects of exploiting
Arctic resources on their own.
3. Navigation Provisions
While overlapping territorial claims in the central Arctic Ocean make it
difficult to assess the exact maritime boundaries of the Arctic Five, the legal
status of Arctic straits is perhaps more obfuscated.183 Although UNCLOS
grants foreign vessels the right of “innocent passage” through territorial
waters,184 free navigation through EEZs,185 and free navigation further out on
the “high seas,”186 no such rights of passage exist within internal waters—
“waters on the landward side of the baseline” from which the territorial zone is
measured.187 Both Russia and Canada have long contended that the Northern
Sea Route and Northwest Passage, respectively, constitute “internal waters”
within the meaning of this provision, thus closed off to access by foreign
vessels without express permission from Moscow and Ottawa.188 Since these
waterways are the only currently-viable trans-Arctic sea lanes,189 Russia and

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 6.
See Spears, supra note 165.
See Byers, China Could be the Future of Arctic Oil, supra note 87.
See id.
See generally BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 129–131.
UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 17.
Id. art. 58.
Id. art. 87.
Id. art. 8.
BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 130.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Canada’s claims have significant implications for commercial shipping
through the region.
Neither claim is uncontested; the U.S. disputes both, arguing that both
waterways are “‘international straits’ through which vessels from all countries
may pass freely.”190 According to the International Court of Justice in the 1949
Corfu Channel Case, a waterway constitutes an international strait if it has a
“geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas” and it is
“used for international navigation.”191 UNCLOS clarifies that foreign vessels
navigating international straits necessarily pass through territorial waters, but
“instead of the regular right of ‘innocent passage’ . . . they benefit from the
enhanced right of ‘transit passage.’”192 This right entitles the vessels to “pass
through the strait without coastal state permission.”193
“Internal waters,” by contrast, are established through “long-term
acquiescence of other countries.”194 Such waters may also arise from the
“drawing of ‘straight baselines’ between headlands and fringing islands,”
according to the decision of the International Court of Justice in the 1951
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and under customary international law.195
Where such waters exist, coastal states are entitled to exert full sovereignty
over transit and may deny access to foreign vessels.196
Given these standards, non-Arctic states are severely limited in their ability
to mount a challenge to the legal status of Arctic straits. In the case of the
Northwest Passage, a key issue is whether the strait was “used for international
navigation” before Canada drew straight baselines in 1985.197 However, there
is no evidence that any non-Arctic state actually used the strait prior to the
drawing of those baselines.198 Only the U.S., which navigated a few vessels
through the Passage before 1985, is positioned to argue that it used the strait

190

BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 129.
Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 28 (Apr. 9).
192 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 130; see also UNCLOS, supra note
6, art. 39.
193 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 130. Foreign vessels exercising this
right must “refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and
expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.” UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 39.
194 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 130.
195 Id. at 130–131.
196 Id. at 130.
197 Id. at 134.
198 Id. at 149.
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for “international navigation.”199 Similarly, having sailed a few vessels through
the Northern Sea Route prior to Russia’s drawing of straight baselines in 1985,
the U.S. is the only country that is positioned to dispute Russia’s claim that
portions of the Route constitute “internal waters.”200 Indeed, no country other
than the U.S. has taken a side in the dispute with Russia thus far, which dates
back to 1963 when the U.S. sailed an icebreaker through Russia’s Laptev
Sea.201
In short, non-Arctic states have little recourse with respect to asserting their
legal rights to sail commercial vessels through the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route. However, even with legal uncertainty, there is no
indication that either Russia or Canada are intent on fully shutting down
shipping at this point; indeed, the rising volume of vessels transiting both sea
routes illustrates that Canada and Russia are likely to continue to look
favorably upon increased traffic through their Arctic corridors.202 Still, some
degree of restrictions will likely be imposed, such as permit fees and
environmental standards, if for no other reason than for coastal states to exact
an economic profit. As a result, shipping volume through the Arctic will
remain limited for the foreseeable future, at least until the Transpolar Sea
Route—which lies far beyond any coastal states’ “internal waters”—opens up
to shipping in the central Arctic around 2050.203
C. The Soft-Law Regime: The Arctic Council
1. Introduction to the Council
Established under the Ottawa Declaration of 1996 as a “high level forum”
for cooperation in the Arctic,204 the Arctic Council has emerged in recent years
as “the most comprehensive international body in the Arctic region.”205 Tasked
with addressing “common Arctic issues” (other than “matters related to
military security”),206 the Council’s central mandate is to promote sustainable
199

Id.
See id. at 144–46.
201 Id. at 144.
202 See discussion supra Part I.A.
203 See discussion supra Part I.A.
204 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council ¶ 1, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter
Ottawa Declaration].
205 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 8.
206 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 204, ¶ 1(a). The Declaration contains just two footnotes, one of which
reads “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.” Id.
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development and environmental protection in the Arctic.207 Accordingly, the
Council has coordinated208 a number of pioneering and influential scientific
studies on emerging issues in the Arctic, including the 2004 Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment,209 the 2007 Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment,210 and the
2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.211 Through these initiatives, the
Council has effectively raised the visibility of Arctic issues and contributed to
national Arctic policy discussions.212
Notwithstanding its achievements in scientific research and policy framing,
however, the Arctic Council is rather “limited as an institution itself.”213 By
design, the Council was created as an informal cooperative forum, not a
binding “intergovernmental organization” as defined under international
law.214 In general, international organizations must (1) be founded on a binding
legal instrument;215 (2) have “at least one organ with a will of its own;” and (3)
be “established under international law.”216 The Arctic Council, however, was
created under the terms of a ministerial declaration, not a binding treaty.217 It
was created without a “separate independent organ . . . to carry out its
particular functions.”218 Indeed—at the insistence of the U.S.—it was
expressly created “without legal personality,”219 meaning it lacks the requisite
207

Id.
The Arctic Council conducts activities through working groups, task forces, and expert groups. U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-435, ARCTIC ISSUES: BETTER DIRECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF
VOLUNTARY RECOMMENDATIONS COULD ENHANCE U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL PARTICIPATION 16 (2014).
209 See generally SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (2004), http://www.amap.no/arctic-climate-impact-assessment-acia.
210 See generally HENRY P. HUNTINGTON, ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC
OIL AND GAS 2007 (2007), http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-oil-and-gas-2007/71.
211 See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT (2009),
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf.
212 Paula Kankaanpaa & Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council, 31 POLAR RES. 1, 1
(2012).
213 Alison Ronson, Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of the Arctic Council, 33 NORTHERN
REV. 95, 100 (2011). See also Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 10 (stating that the Arctic Council is
widely considered a “policy-shaping body rather than a policy-making body”).
214 Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 712, 712 (1999).
215 See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY
WITHIN DIVERSITY §§ 34–36 (5th ed. 2011).
216 Id. § 33.
217 Some legal scholars question whether a founding treaty is actually required to qualify as an
international organization. See, e.g., BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 9 n.36
(noting that “[a]lthough the Arctic Council is based on a declaration rather than a founding treaty, such a treaty
is not a necessary condition for an international organization”).
218 Waliul Hasanat, Definitional Constraints Regarding Soft Law, 3 AALCO Q. BULL. 8, 21 (2007).
219 Bloom, supra note 214, at 714.
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“capacity . . . to conclude treaties” on its own.220 Rather, the Arctic Council is
a “soft law” institution—it “creates norms [and] standards of behavior without
creating legally binding obligations on [its] member states.”221 Decisions are
reached by consensus, and members may elect to implement or reject Council
recommendations based simply on national interests and political
motivations.222
More recently, however, the Arctic Council has assumed a more
authoritative role as the reality of accelerating climate change has altered its
members’ national priorities in the region. At its 2011 Ministerial Meeting in
Nuuk, Greenland the Arctic Council established a permanent secretariat to be
located in Tromsø, Norway.223 According to one scholar, this “arguably
transform[ed] the Arctic Council from an inter-governmental forum into an
international organization.”224 However, while arguably an independent suborgan of the Council under the international legal definition,225 the secretariat’s
“mandate and function are relatively modest [and] mostly administrative in
nature.”226 Additionally, while the secretariat itself holds domestic legal
personality under Norwegian law,227 the Council as a whole continues to
operate without international legal personality.228 Still, despite these

220 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations art. 6, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The preamble to the Convention states that “international organizations possess the
capacity to conclude treaties which is necessary for the exercise of their functions and fulfillment of their
purposes.” Id. pmbl. This adopts the International Court of Justice’s approach in Certain Expenses of the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, at 167–68 (July 20).
221 Ronson, supra note 213.
222 Bloom, supra note 214, at 718. And even if members implement recommendations, the Council has
difficulty evaluating such implementation as it possesses limited enforcement and monitoring power. Ronson,
supra note 213.
223 Arctic Council, Nuuk Declaration, Seventh Ministerial Meeting, at 2 (May 12, 2011), http://arcticcouncil.npolar.no/accms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-ministerial/docs/Nuuk_Declaration_
FINAL.pdf.
224 See, e.g., BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 9.
225 See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 215, § 33.
226 Charron, supra note 142.
227 Host Country Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Arctic Council
Secretariat art. 2 (Mar. 2012). Under Article 2 of the Host Country Agreement, “The Secretariat has legal
personality and capacity to perform its functions in Norway. It has, in particular, the capacity to contract, to
acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property, and to institute and be a party to legal proceedings.”
Id.
228 ERIK J. MOLENAAR, ALEX G. OUDE ELFERINK & DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
THE POLAR REGIONS: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGIMES 41 (2013) (stating that “the
Arctic Council still operates without legal personality”).
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limitations, the establishment of a secretariat may go far to advance the
Council’s ability to “broker cooperation” in the Arctic.229
More significantly, the Council has recently become “the focal point for
treaty-making” in the Arctic.230 In 2011, members adopted a search-and-rescue
treaty,231 “the first legally binding instrument concluded under the auspices of
the Arctic Council.”232 A second binding agreement concerning oil spill
preparation and response was signed at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in
2013.233 Whether these treaties are precedent-setting is uncertain at this point;
there is certainly the potential for the Council to transform into a “policymaking,” rather than a “policy-shaping” body.234 In any event, the Arctic
Council’s recent actions have solidified its status as a “prominent player” in
Arctic affairs.235 Circumpolar as well as non-Arctic states are mindful of this
growing prominence and increasingly view participation in the Council as a
key avenue to influencing Arctic affairs.
2. Expansion of the Council
Several distinct groups comprise the Arctic Council: members, permanent
participants, observers, ad-hoc observers, the Council chair (which rotates
between members every 2 years), the secretariat, and six working groups.236
Full membership is limited to the eight nations with territory north of the
Arctic Circle (the “Arctic Eight”)—Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, the
229 REBECCA H. PINCUS & SALEEM H. ALI, DIPLOMACY ON ICE: ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC 53 (2015).
230 Timo Koivurova, Increasing Relevance of Treaties: The Case of the Arctic, AJIL UNBOUND (May 6,
2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/increasing-relevance-treaties-case-arctic-agora-end-treaties.
231 See generally Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the
Arctic (May 12, 2011), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/531/Arctic_SAR_
Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
232 BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 9. In other words, members used the
Council as a forum to conclude a treaty amongst themselves; however, the Council itself did not conclude the
treaty, and thus it continues to operate without legal personality. See Vienna Convention, supra note 220.
233 See generally Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the
Arctic (May 15, 2013), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/529/MM08_agreement_
on_oil_pollution_preparedness_and_response_%20in_the_arctic_formatted%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&is
Allowed=y.
234 Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 10.
235 Id. at 1.
236 The Council’s six working groups, each with its own specific mandate, are the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program (ACAP); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); Protection of the Arctic
Marine Environment (PAME); and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). See Working Groups,
ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups.
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U.S., Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.237 These nations are empowered to vote,
make policy, and administer projects.238 By contrast, permanent participants—
made up of groups representing indigenous Arctic communities—are not
granted voting privileges; they are, however, entitled to participate in all
meetings and to “full consultation prior to the forming of decisions.”239 This
fairly unique structure is “comparatively new [] in international cooperation”240
as it grants indigenous groups a “more significant [role] than is typically
afforded them at other U.N. or multilateral meetings and conferences.”241
Observers are a significantly weaker—and larger242—constituency than
Council members and permanent participants. Under the Ottawa Declaration,
observer status is open to non-Arctic states and organizations that “the Council
determines can contribute to its work.”243 Originally, six non-Arctic states—all
of them European—held observer status: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland,
and the United Kingdom, joined by France in 2000 and Spain in 2006.244 Then
in 2007, China submitted an application for permanent observer status,
triggering a new wave of interest from non-Arctic states in joining the
Council.245 By 2009, Italy, South Korea, and the European Union (EU) had
submitted applications,246 followed shortly thereafter by India, Japan, and
237 Member States, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states
(last updated Sept. 10, 2015). In 2013, each of the eight members contributed $58,000 per year (a 12.5% equal
contribution) toward the Secretariat budget. ARCTIC COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, INDICATIVE BUDGET FOR 2013, at
5 (2012).
238 Charron, supra note 142.
239 Id.
240 Hasanat, supra note 218, at 19.
241 Charron, supra note 142. See also Press Release, Walter and Duncan Gordon Found., Eyeing
Resources: India, China, Brazil, Japan, Other Countries Want a Voice on Arctic Council (Jan. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter Eyeing Resources], http://gordonfoundation.ca/press-release/438 (“The Arctic Council is the only
international organization that gives indigenous peoples a formal place at the table”).
242 There are currently twelve non-Arctic states and twenty organizations admitted as permanent
observers, including nine intergovernmental organizations and eleven non-governmental organizations.
Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arcticcouncil/observers. With a ratio of “4 observers for every Member State with decision-making clout,” the
Council is fairly lopsided, posing potential problems. Charron, supra note 142.
243 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 204, ¶ 3.
244 Kathrin Keil, A New Model for International Cooperation, ARCTIC INST. (Feb 20, 2014),
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/02/a-new-model-for-international.html. See also Charron, supra note
142.
245 Matthew Willis & Duncan Depledge, How We Learned to Stop Worrying About China's Arctic
Ambitions: Understanding China's Admission to the Arctic Council, 2004-2013, ARCTIC INST. (Sept. 22,
2014), http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/09/092214-China-arctic-ambitions-arctic-council.html.
246 Mia Bennett, Round-up from the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, FOREIGN POL’Y ASS’N (May 1,
2009), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/05/01/round-up-from-the-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-22/.
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Singapore, “along with a host of non-governmental organizations.”247 All of
these applications, however, were deferred.248 The Arctic Eight were divided
as to whether to admit new observers: Nordic countries were “favourably [sic]
disposed to admitting any applicant who made a reasonable case,”249 while
Canada and Russia feared that “a greatly enlarged contingent of observers
would overwhelm the current members, particularly the indigenous groups.”250
The result was an impasse, since the Council requires consensus to act.251
Russia and Canada’s aversion to expansion, however, was perhaps
misguided. To be sure, permanent observers are granted a measure of influence
at the Arctic Council. Unlike ad-hoc observers, permanent observers are
automatically invited to all Council meetings.252 They can utilize their
“expertise and money [to] influence decisions in the [C]ouncil’s six working
groups.”253 They can “propose projects” and finance them.254 And they can
“submit written statements at Ministerial meetings.”255 Permanent observers
are not, however, empowered to speak at Council meetings and have no voting
rights.256 And while observers are permitted to finance projects, their
contributions “may not exceed the financing from Arctic States.”257 Ultimate
decision-making authority therefore rests entirely with the Arctic Eight, as
does the primary ability to discuss Council policy and direct the Council’s six
working groups.
Nevertheless, stasis among the Arctic Eight persisted, leading the Council
in 2011 to publish an official observer manual258 and adopt a new set of criteria
247

Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
As the first of the new applicants, China had its application for observer status denied three times (at
each of the Ministerial Meetings occurring in 2007, 2009, and 2011), before finally being accepted in 2013.
See Rebecca Lindegren, Arctic Council Adds Five Permanent Asian Observers, INT’L REL. ONLINE BLOG
(June 13, 2013), http://ironline.american.edu/arctic-council-adds-five-permanent-asian-observers/.
249 Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
250 See Eyeing Resources, supra note 241.
251 Bloom, supra note 214, at 718.
252 SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS (SAO) REPORT TO MINISTERS 50–51 (2011) [hereinafter SAO REPORT].
253 A Warmer Welcome, ECONOMIST (May 18, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/international/
21578040-arctic-council-admits-its-first-permanent-asian-observers-warmer-welcome. See also SAO REPORT,
supra note 252, at 51 (“[O]bservers should continue to make relevant contributions through their engagement
in the Arctic Council primarily at the level of Working Groups”).
254 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 51. However, observers’ “financial contributions . . . may not exceed
the financing from Arctic States, unless otherwise decided.” Id.
255 Id.
256 A Warmer Welcome, supra note 253.
257 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 51.
258 See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER MANUAL FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES
(2011).
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for admitting observers, including a restatement of the role of observers on the
Council.259 These documents served two purposes: to reaffirm the primacy of
the Arctic Eight on the Council, thereby reassuring Russia and Canada that
expansion would not improperly dilute their influence, and to buttress the
rights of the Council’s permanent participants.260 Under the new criteria,
observers must “recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in the Arctic.”261 Observers must also “recognize that an extensive
legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean, including [] the Law of the Sea,
and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible
management of this ocean.”262 Finally, observers must have “political
willingness” and “financial ability” to contribute to the Council’s work, as well
as demonstrated “Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the
Arctic Council.”263
Unsurprisingly, these conditions proved somewhat contentious. For
example, it seemed unlikely that China would accept the second condition,
which seemed to imply that the littoral Arctic states had “the right to
administer the entire Arctic Ocean.”264 In the past, a Chinese Rear Admiral had
gone so far as to claim that the “Arctic belongs to all people around the world
as no nation has sovereignty over it.”265 Officially, however, China’s remarks
on the new criteria affirmed the “Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in the Arctic, as well as their decision-making power in the
Council.”266 Regardless of whether China simply adopted this posture for
political expediency, it has remained the official narrative through the
present.267
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SAO REPORT, supra note 252.
Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
261 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 50.
262 Id.
263 Id. These conditions expand upon the Ottawa Declaration’s brief statement that observers must be able
to “contribute to [the Council’s] work.” Ottawa Declaration, supra note 204, ¶ 3.
264 See, e.g., BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, supra note 62, at 255.
265 Chang, supra note 129.
266 Lan Lijun, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Canada, Statement at the Meeting
between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.arcticcouncil.org/images/PDF_attachments/Observer_DMM_2012/ACOBSDMMSE01_Stockholm_2012_Observer
_Meeting_Statement_Ambassador_Lan_Lijun_China.pdf.
267 For example, after China gained observer status in 2013, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong
Lei reaffirmed that “China recognizes the Arctic countries’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
Arctic area, as well as their leading role in the Arctic Council.” Zhi, supra note 86.
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Following the publication of these guidelines, observer applications were
again deferred until the next Ministerial Meeting; however, by 2013, “the
‘observer question’ was beginning to assume its own degree of geopolitical
importance.”268 As Arctic sea ice levels melted to record-low levels and
commercial activity in the region increased,269 global economic players were
keen to have a say in designing the rules and norms affecting that activity.
Indeed, the Arctic Eight were conscious that failure to reach a decision as to
observer applications would “undermine the [Council’s] status as the region’s
key policy-shaping forum, [and] that other forums . . . might emerge to fill the
leadership void.”270 Moreover, “[c]ontinued deadlock or a bungled outcome
would [] damage the image of openness that the [Council] was seeking to
project.”271 Whatever residual objections the Arctic Eight had towards
expansion, preserving the global legitimacy of the Arctic Council became the
overriding concern, leading members to generally endorse the addition of new
observers.272
Subsequently, after some debate,273 six new permanent observers were
admitted to the Arctic Council at its 2013 Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna,
Sweden.274 China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Italy’s
applications were approved;275 the EU’s bid, however, was again deferred
pending the resolution of an ongoing dispute between the EU and Canada over
a 2008 EU import ban on seal products.276 In response, EU foreign policy chief
Catherine Ashton stated that the “EU will now work expeditiously with
[Canada] to address the outstanding issue of their concern.”277
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Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
270 Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
271 Id.
272 See id.
273 Id.
274 Arctic Council Secretariat, Kiruna Declaration, Eighth Ministerial Meeting, at 6 (May 15, 2013),
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/93/MM08_Kiruna_Declaration_final_formatted.
pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y [hereinafter Kiruna Declaration]. See also Myers, supra note 2.
275 Kiruna Declaration, supra note 274.
276 Andreas Østhagen, In or Out? The Symbolism of the EU’s Arctic Council Bid, ARCTIC INST. (June 18,
2013), http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/in-or-out-symbolism-of-eus-arctic.html. The Council noted
that it “affirmatively receive[d] the application of the EU for observer status,” but that it “defer[ed] a final
decision on implementation until the Council ministers are agreed . . . that the concerns of Council members
. . . are resolved.” Kiruna Declaration, supra note 274.
277 Nikolaj Nielsen, China Beats EU to Arctic Council Membership, EUOBSERVER (May 16, 2013),
https://euobserver.com/eu-china/120138.
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To an extent, Canada’s veto of the EU’s application symbolizes the
growing significance of the Council as a “conveyor of substantial political
messages.”278 Although seal products hold little economic significance in EUCanada trade relations, they remain of “grave importance to the local
indigenous peoples living off such activities.”279 Consequently, the dispute is
“pivotal to Canada’s self-portrayal as an Arctic nation.”280 More generally,
Canada’s exercise of its veto power signals the dominance of the Artic states in
Arctic affairs.281 Indeed, permanent observer status carries only limited
benefits, so the real issue is symbolic: “who is in or who is out, and who has
the power to decide.”282 For now, the EU is “out” until a resolution favorable
to Canada is reached; China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Italy,
by contrast, are “in.”
3. Implications of Expansion
The Arctic Council’s expansion to admit six new permanent observers has
significant implications for Arctic governance and development. In practical
terms, additional observers will advance the Council’s work by financing
projects and contributing expertise on Arctic affairs.283 New observers will also
strengthen cooperation on various Council initiatives, such as measures to
combat climate change.284 However, since permanent observers have only
limited rights,285 the implications of expansion are mostly symbolic.
First, expansion signals international consensus as to the legitimacy of the
“patchwork” legal regime administering the Arctic region.286 Having accepted
the 2011 admissions criteria, new observers explicitly affirm the primacy of
the Arctic Eight’s sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Arctic.287 By extension,
this demonstrates “broad international acceptance” of the Council’s role as the
Arctic’s leading inter-governmental forum and “strengthens the position of the

278 Nils Wang, Arctic Security–An Equation with Multiple Unknowns, 15 J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD. 16,
17 (2013).
279 Østhagen, supra note 276.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 50.
284 Charron, supra note 142.
285 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
286 WEIDEMANN, supra note 136, at 228.
287 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 50. Observers “recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in the Arctic.” Id.
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Arctic Council on the global scene.”288 Acceptance of the admissions criteria
also explicitly signals international consensus as to the primacy of UNCLOS as
the regulator of the Arctic Ocean.289 Because UNCLOS grants the Arctic Five
exclusive jurisdiction over the vast majority of the Arctic’s resources,290
acceptance of this condition indicates new observers’ intent to cooperate with
the Arctic Five in exploiting those resources.
Second, expansion greatly enhances the Arctic Council’s international
profile. With the inclusion of five Asian states, the Council no longer
exclusively represents the interests of non-Arctic European observers, as was
the case prior to its 2013 Ministerial Meeting.291 Furthermore, the admission of
China means that all five U.N. Security Council permanent members—China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.—are now either members or
observers at the Council.292 By “globalizing” its constituency to include these
major world powers, the Council’s actions will carry greater apparent
legitimacy; in turn, this will enhance the Council’s ability to coalesce broad
international support for Arctic initiatives.
Third—and perhaps most significantly—the Council’s admission of six
distant observers signals the legitimacy of non-Arctic states’ interests in the
Arctic region. Chinese analysts were quick to reach this conclusion in the wake
of the Council’s decision; for example, Qu Xing, head of the China Institute of
International Studies, stated that “being granted observer status shows that
China’s activities in and opinions about the region have been recognized by all
member states.”293 China’s official news agency added that the decision would
“guarantee [China’s] legitimate rights and activities in the region.”294 This
sentiment was explicitly endorsed by the Danish Foreign Minister, who stated
that the Arctic Council’s expansion “reflects the fact that many countries
outside the Arctic area also have legitimate interests in the development of the
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Myers, supra note 2.
Wang, supra note 278. Observers are required to “recognize that an extensive legal framework applies
to the Arctic Ocean, including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid
foundation for responsible management of this ocean.” SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 50.
290 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
291 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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region.”295 The remaining Arctic states at least implicitly endorsed this notion
by casting affirmative votes to admit the new observers.
III. REFORMING ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: GLOBALIZING ARCTIC COOPERATION
Notwithstanding the symbolic implications of the Arctic Council’s
expansion to admit new observers,296 non-Arctic states remain disadvantaged
under the Arctic legal framework. As discussed above, the vast majority of
Arctic hydrocarbons297 and both currently-accessible trans-Arctic shipping
routes298 are subject to littoral state control under UNCLOS. Arctic governance
is likewise dominated by circumpolar actors, as the Arctic Council
significantly restricts the participatory rights of non-Arctic states. Not only are
non-Arctic observers denied speaking and voting rights, but their financial
contributions are prohibited from exceeding those of the Arctic Eight.299 Adhoc observers have even fewer rights, requiring permission to attend all
Council meetings.300 As the Arctic region globalizes, these structural
disparities threaten the continued viability of the Arctic Council in two primary
ways.
First, limited participation by non-Arctic states will inhibit the overall
effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Caps on financial contributions by
observers, for example, may result in Council projects going underfunded,
particularly since funding from member states is fairly unreliable.301 Indeed,
under the Council’s voluntary financing system, members may simply opt out
of funding projects altogether, even once those projects are already
underway.302 Thus, while observers may propose projects and fund them to the

295 Chris Irvine, China Granted Permanent Observer Status at Arctic Council, TELEGRAPH (May 15,
2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10060624/China-granted-permanent-observerstatus-at-Arctic-Council.html.
296 See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
297 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
298 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
299 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 51.
300 Jane George, Arctic Council: EU Out But China Likely In, Academics Say, NUNATSIAQ ONLINE (Apr.
29, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_eu_out_but_china_
likely_in_academics_say/.
301 Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 4. Indeed, the “greatest hindrance to the effectiveness of the
council is the lack of a reliable source of funding to cover general operating expenses.” Id.
302 WEIDEMANN, supra note 136, at 56. If a project simply “drops from the agenda of the funding state and
no other [member] is willing to take over, it may fail before being completed.” Id. This happened, for example,
to the Circumpolar Protected Areas Network project in 2010. See id.

RAINWATER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

11/9/2015 2:45 PM

GLOBALIZATION OF THE ARCTIC

149

same extent as members,303 they remain powerless to see those projects
through to completion. Given the risk of wasted time and resources, this rule
may ultimately discourage non-Arctic states from funding Council projects or
even bringing their own scientific initiatives under the umbrella of the
Council.304 As a result, the Council will remain limited in its ability to produce
influential environmental studies and policy guidelines.
More fundamentally, restrictions on non-Arctic observers’ speaking rights
will inhibit effectiveness by stifling the “cross-pollination of ideas”305 at the
Arctic Council. As an informal cooperative forum with a diverse constituency,
the key component of the Council’s success is its facilitation of “dialogue
among different knowledge groups.”306 Largely restricting that dialogue to
regional actors—even as the Arctic itself globalizes—will inevitably constrain
the breadth and diversity of ideas exchanged at the Council, thereby limiting
the Council’s capacity to generate creative and effective solutions to emerging
Arctic issues.
Second, limited opportunities for participation at the Council may lead nonArctic states to pursue alternative avenues for regional engagement.307 For
example, non-Arctic states might view bilateral dealings with the Arctic states
as a superior means to achieve regional goals. China has pursued such a
strategy in recent years, individually courting the Arctic Eight to position itself
as an indispensable Arctic player.308 Similarly, non-Arctic states may view
participation in various alternative forums as more rewarding than the Council.
One potential alternative is the nonprofit Arctic Circle, an inclusive309 forum
that facilitates dialogue among global stakeholders on “rapid changes in the
Arctic.”310 Already numerous distant states, frustrated by their inability to
speak at the Council, have begun to focus their attention on the Arctic
303

SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 51.
Aldo Chircop, Should Observer Participation in Arctic Ocean Governance be Enhanced?, CAN.
NAVAL REV., Winter 2012, at 2, 3.
305 Charron, supra note 142.
306 Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 4.
307 Id. at 11.
308 See Rainwater, supra note 4, at 71–73.
309 The Arctic Circle is “open to all.” Paul Koring, New Arctic Group Gives Canada Political
Competition, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 16, 2013, 3:30 AM), http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/newarctic-group-gives-canada-political-competition/article11243970?service=mobile.
310 Global Leaders Gather for Inaugural Arctic Circle Assembly Oct. 12-14, 2013, in Reykjavik, Iceland,
PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/global-leaders-gather-forinaugural-arctic-circle-assembly-october-12-14-2013-in-reykjavik-iceland-226735641.html
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Global Leaders Gather]. The forum grants all stakeholders an equal say under “one large ‘open tent.’” Id.
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Circle.311 This surge of interest will no doubt test the Council’s status as the
“region’s key policy-shaping forum,”312 and could lead to the inevitable
“marginalization of the [Council] as a force to be reckoned with.”313
In sum, the current regional model of Arctic governance is no longer
adequate to meet the challenges of a globalized Arctic. As the Arctic develops,
non-Arctic states are vying for a say in designing the rules and norms
regulating that development. Failure to meaningfully engage these states
threatens the viability of the Council, both in terms of its institutional
effectiveness and its regional primacy. As a result, the Arctic Council should
implement structural reforms that better account for the interests of non-Arctic
states in the region, as well as increase its collaboration with alternative Arctic
forums that offer distant actors significant participatory rights.
In terms of structural reform, the Arctic Council should abolish its
prohibition on non-Arctic observers’ funds exceeding those of Arctic Eight.
Apart from “exercise of control,” this rule serves no functional purpose;314
rather, it hampers the Council’s work, especially as funds from member states
are unreliable under the voluntary system.315 Likewise, the Council should
grant observers limited speaking rights at ministerial meetings. Currently,
observers are allowed only to submit written statements at such meetings;316
this right should be expanded to empower observers to make verbal statements,
subject to the discretion of the Chair, after the Arctic Eight and permanent
participants have spoken. This will encourage a broader exchange of ideas at
the Council, thereby allowing for a more robust dialogue on emerging Arctic
issues.
Undoubtedly, efforts to enhance non-Arctic state participation will be met
with resistance from Russia and Canada, who remain worried that increasing
external influence will dilute their status at the Council.317 However, without
voting rights, non-Arctic state observers will continue to play a secondary role
at the Council, leaving ultimate decision-making authority to the Arctic Eight.
311 Koring, supra note 309. Indeed, at its inaugural assembly in 2013, the Arctic Circle was likely “the
largest and most diverse gathering of its kind,” with over 900 participants from forty countries, including
Arctic Council observers such as China and India. Global Leaders Gather, supra note 310.
312 Willis & Depledge, supra note 245.
313 Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 13.
314 Chircop, supra note 304, at 3.
315 Kankaanpaa & Young, supra note 212, at 4.
316 SAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 51.
317 See Eyeing Resources, supra note 241.
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Indeed, under the strict 2011 Admissions Criteria, observers explicitly affirm
the authority of the Arctic states in Arctic affairs. Rather, structural reforms
will greatly enhance the Council’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate of
sustainable development and environmental protection. First and foremost,
reforms allowing for greater funds and increased dialogue will strengthen the
Council’s operational capabilities. At the same time, efforts to enhance the
participation of non-Arctic states in Council activities will increase their
commitment to Council outputs;318 and will help position the Council as “the
most logical and appropriate venue for shaping international coordination in
the Arctic.”319
In addition to these structural reforms, the Council should increase its
engagement and coordination with alternative regional forums. As globallyinclusive forums such as the Arctic Circle grow in prominence, the Council’s
influence will diminish, leading to the decentralization of Arctic policyshaping. Since the Arctic Eight do not necessarily play a dominant role at such
forums, Arctic policy may ultimately be designed “without the consent of, and
even opposing, the Arctic states.”320 Disparate regional guidelines and
standards may consequently proliferate, creating confusion and harming the
effectiveness of the Council. The Council should therefore take the lead in
engaging these forums to coordinate a coherent regulatory regime. Further,
since non-Arctic states may hold significant influence in these alternative
forums, coordination will ultimately ensure that their preferences are
represented in the overarching Arctic framework.
CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the Arctic region has fundamentally transformed
from a frozen wasteland into the “last global frontier” of economic
opportunity.321 As the polar ice sheet melts to record-low levels, vast untapped
hydrocarbon deposits and shipping shortcuts are opening up to commercial
development. As a result, the Arctic is rapidly becoming globalized as nonArctic states increasingly vie for a say in Arctic affairs.
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In some significant ways, the Arctic states have taken steps to
accommodate the interests of these distant states. Most notably, the Arctic
Council’s admission of six additional non-Arctic observers in 2013 served to
generally legitimize the interests of non-Arctic states in the region, while also
granting those six states a measure of influence in Arctic affairs. For example,
non-Arctic observers are empowered to influence the Council’s work by
financing projects and sharing their expertise on Arctic matters.
However, despite this gesture, non-Arctic states remain significantly
disadvantaged with respect to pursuing their Arctic interests. Under UNCLOS,
most of the Arctic’s resources and both Arctic sea lanes are exclusively
controlled by the littoral Arctic states. Arctic governance is also dominated by
regional actors, as non-Arctic states are denied speaking and voting privileges
at the Arctic Council. These structural disparities not only harm the interests of
non-Arctic states, but also undermine the effectiveness of the Council and may
ultimately cause the Council to lose its relevancy as non-Arctic states simply
focus their attention elsewhere.
Consequently, the current Arctic regime is no longer adequate to address
the challenges of a globalized Arctic; as such, a more inclusive, international
approach to Arctic governance is now necessary. Namely, the Arctic Council
should enhance the participatory rights of non-Arctic states by abolishing caps
on financial contributions and permitting observers some speaking rights at
ministerial meetings. At the same time, the Council should engage other Arctic
forums to coordinate coherent Arctic policies that account for the interests of
states around the world.
To be sure, the Arctic Eight should continue to play a predominant role in
Arctic affairs; non-Arctic states should not be elevated to the same status as
regional actors, given their inherent detachment from local Arctic challenges
and opportunities. Yet, as one study has noted, “[g]iven the economic and
political shifts occurring at the global level today, there is no way to address
Arctic issues successfully without recognizing the heightened connectivity
between the Arctic and the global system.”322 Indeed, the Arctic is no longer a
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strictly insular region; circumpolar actors must therefore take steps to adapt to
the challenges of a globalized Arctic.
SHILOH RAINWATER∗

∗ Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory
University School of Law (2016); B.A., magna cum laude, Pepperdine University (2013). The author would
like to thank Robert Ahdieh, Vice Dean of Emory Law School, for his advice and suggestions on this
Comment.

